OPS4103 Military Strategy and Joint Operations

Course code: 
OPS4103
Course name in Norwegian Bokmål: 
Militærstrategi og fellesoperasjoner
Program of study: 
Master i militære studier
Credits: 
15
Level of study: 
Master
Teaching semester: 
2022 Spring
Assessment semester: 
2022 Spring
Language of instruction: 
Norwegian / English
Person in charge: 
Morten Andersen
Course content

The core of the Armed Forces' activities is the planning, management, implementation and support of military operations. With this as a starting point, the course Military Strategy and Joint Operations builds on the content of the course MILM4101 Politics, Strategy and Military Power. The central point of departure for the subject is that an officer must understand the uniqueness of the nature of war and conflict, and that military operations are always carried out against thinking opponents with opposing wills. War and conflict are thus about organized state-sanctioned use of force, aimed at both state or non-state actors. Against this background, the course will provide students with advanced knowledge and insight into relevant topics that affect the planning, management, implementation and support of military operations at the military strategic and operational level. Consequently, the course will emphasize critical analysis of the operational environment and key factors that influence the planning and application of military forces and instruments in the framework of political guidelines and strategic objectives. The course also sheds light on the actual planning activity that is carried out at the military strategic and operational level, and factors that affect the military problem-solving approach at these levels. For officers who plan, lead, carry out and support operations, regardless of level of operation, it is crucial that they know and understand opportunities and limitations down in the organization, as well as intentions and goals at a higher level. The practice of operational art and the interplay between what has traditionally been described as the military strategic, operational and tactical levels therefore has a central place in the subject. The course is divided into seven contiguous thematic sections:

Part 1 - Strategic environment and military strategy: The first part of the course (one week) focuses on the concept of military strategy and selected parts of the strategic environment in Norway, NATO and with our most important ally. This is primarily related to the expectation that an officer understands why and how military operations are to be carried out, and understands the political and social context in which the individual military operation is carried out. This part of the course will therefore give students an in-depth insight and knowledge about responsibilities, authority and tasks assigned to actors in the strategic environment, and how various actors are able to support the military strategic command level.

Part 2 - The operating environment and its impact on military forces: The second part of the course (one week) sheds light on today's and tomorrow's operating environment. In this, students will gain in-depth insight and knowledge about key conditions and factors in the operating environment, and how they affect military forces' opportunities and limitations during the implementation of joint operations - both in connection with intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Selected cultural, ethical and legal perspectives and frameworks are highlighted and problematized along the way in this part of the course.

Part 3 - Military problem solving: The third part of the course (one week) focuses on military problem solving. This is primarily related to the fact that the officers' role and function in the military profession are closely linked to the planning of operations. It follows that the course seeks to develop the students' ability to think critically about analytical problem solving in the preparation of practical operational solutions. This involves the ability to analyze and prepare military response options within today's operational paradigms, but it will be equally important that the officers acquire the ability for critical thinking that enables them to develop the Armed Forces' next operational paradigm.

Part 4 - Strategic thinking and analysis: The fourth part of the course (one week) focuses on analysis and planning activities at the military strategic level. This part builds on the military problem solving that is dealt with in the third part of the course, and introduces key elements that are part of a military strategic analysis. The students will discuss central themes around military strategic analysis work, analysis of the surrounding world and situations and the preparation of military response options. The activities will be conducted within a scenario-based NATO context.

Part 5 - Planning joint operations: The fifth part of the course (four weeks) uses NATO's methodology for operational planning and the conceptual framework associated with it. The purpose of this is to provide students with in-depth knowledge and skills related to joint operational planning processes in NATO, including the possibilities and limitations of the processes. The planning activities will be done within the continued, scenario-based NATO context from part 4 of the course.

Part 6 - Conduct of joint operations: The sixth part of the course (three weeks) deals with the implementation phase of a joint operation. This part of the course is conducted as a practice arena (Joint Effort), where students staff selected relevant positions in a, for the practice arena established, operational headquarters. During the implementation, special focus will be placed on joint operational coordination and synchronization of operations across time horizons and processes at the headquarters.

Part 7 - Course synthesis: The seventh part of the course (1 week) will deal with synthesis, where the purpose is to have an in-depth reflection on the course's various parts and activities. Based on the learning outcomes, the students carry out individual reflection and theory- and practice-based critical reflection and discussion in syndicates and groups.

Learning outcome

Learning outcome

Knowledge:

After completing the course, the student should have:

  • in-depth knowledge of the role and military application of military forces in interaction with other means of political power and actors in a conflict area.
  • advanced knowledge of the factors that influence the planning, management and conduct of military operations in an operating environment.
  • in-depth knowledge of joint operational planning and implementation processes in NATO, including their capabilities and limitations.

Skills:

After completing the course, the student can:

  • analyze military strategic conditions, operational concepts and doctrines within military joint operations.
  • analyze and critically reflect on how political and military strategic conditions, the operating environment, legal framework and ethics affect the planning, management and implementation of joint operations.
  • analyze and be critical towards theoretical and practical military problem solving.
  • critically apply NATO's conceptual framework and methodology for operational planning.
  • critically apply processes and procedures used in a joint operational headquarters.

General competence:

After completing the course, the student can:

  • apply acquired knowledge and skills to communicate about professional issues, analyzes and conclusions related to the use of military force, both with other specialists in the field and to the general public.
  • translate theoretical knowledge of joint operations into practice, with the ability for reflection and critical approach to established planning tools and processes.
Working and learning activities

The course Military Strategy and Joint Operations consists of seven different thematic parts. The course's pedagogical basis is constructive alignment, where there is a clear, planned connection between the course's learning outcomes, learning activities and exam. The course's pedagogical structure is so-called «hybrid learning», where students will conttribute in various student-active forms of learning. In addition to live and recorded lectures, online meetings, group discussions, problem-based assignments, seminars, reflection and self-study are included.

 

Sensor system

Examination is carried out according to the Regulations for Admission, Studies and Examinations (in Norwegian, “Forskrift om opptak, studier og eksamen”) at the Norwegian Defence University College.

Curriculum

Total number of pages in syllabus is 1291 pages:

Self-chosen syllabus (50 pages):

Students shall choose 50 pages (+/- 5 pages) of literature as self-chosen syllabus. The syllabus can be selected from described support literature or other literature. Self-selected literature must directly address the learning outcomes of the course and must be approved by the course coordinator (work requirement 3). Self-selected literature must be used in the exam paper

Part 1 – Strategic Environment and Military Strategy

218 pages: 

Andersen, M. og Sookermany, A. McD.  (2021). The Making of Military Strategy: The Gravity of an Unequal Dialogue. I J. H. Matlary og R. Johnson (Red.), Military Strategy in the 21st Century – The Challenge for NATO. London: C. Hurst & Co., s. 131-152 (22 s.). 

Andersen, M. (2016). Hva er fellesoperasjoner. I M. Andersen & G. Ødegaard (Red.), Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 21-28 (8 s.).  

Andersen, M. og Ydstebø P. (2016). Hva er operasjonskunst. I M. Andersen & G. Ødegaard (Red.), Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 29-41 (13 s.).  

Berkebile, Richard E. (2018). Military Strategy Revisited – A Critique of the Lykke Formulation. I Military Review Online Exclusive – May 2018, s. 1-7 (7 s.). 

Brantley, Aaron og Smeets, Max. (2020). Military Operations in Cyberspace. I A. Sookermany (Red.), Handbook of Military Sciences. Hentet fra https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4#toc. (13 s.). 

Bruscino, T. (2020). The Leavenworth Heresy? Carlisle: US Army War College. Hentet fra https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/the-leavenworth-heresy/ (4 s.). 

Johansen, S. R. og Staib, J. T. (2016). Operasjonell rett. I M. Andersen & G. Ødegaard (Red.), Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 475-499 (25 s.). 

Karlsen, Geir Hågen. (2016). Strategisk kommunikasjon: NATOs modell for informasjon og påvirkning. I M. Andersen & G. Ødegaard (Red.), Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 291-316 (25 s.). 

Kelly, J. & Brennan, M. J. (2010). The Leavenworth Heresy and the perversion of operational art. Joint Force Quarterly (56), s. 109-116. (7 s.). 

Libyautvalget (2018). Evaluering av norsk deltagelse i Libya-operasjonene i 2011. Oslo: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon, s. 48-63 (15 s.).  

NATO (2019). AJP-3 (C). Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations – Edition C Version 1. Brussels: NATO, s. 1-1 – 1-44 og B-1 – B-5 (49 s.). 

NATO (2019). MC 362/2, NATO Rules of engagement, Brussels, s. 2-16 (14 s.).  

Valeriano, Brandon G. & Jenson, Ben (2019). The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Cyber Restraint. Cato Institute Policy Analysis (16 s.).

 

 Part 2 – The Operations Environment
180 pages:

Beadle, A.W. (2014). Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications. FFI-rapport 2014/00519, s. 7-21 (14 s.).

Berntsen, T. A. og Tyreid, T. (2016). Etikk og militære operasjoner. I M. Andersen & G. Ødegaard (Red.), Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 105-125 (21 s.).    

Cook, M. L. (2015). The Role of the Military in the Decision to Use Armed Force. I J.T. Johnson & F. Patterson (Red.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics. Burlington: Ashgate, s. 49-56 (8 s.).  

Fierke, K.M. (2007). Identity. I Critical Approaches to International Security. Polity Press, s. 75-98 (23 s.)

FFI (2020). Globale trender. Viten 1/2020. Hentet fra: https://publications.ffi.no/nb/item/asset/dspace:6740/20-01409.pdf. (40 s.). 

Holen, S.V. (2020). Civilians under Attack: Diverging Threat Perspectives. I Enstad, K. & Holmes-Eber, P.  (Red.), Warriors or Peacekeepers? Building military cultural competence. Springer (21 s.).
 
Holen, S.V. (2020) Humanizing Security: The Military as Protection Actor. I NATO Office of the Secretary General Human Security Unit, Protecting Civilians: A Humanitarian Obligation. Essay Series on the Protection of Civilians, Children and Armed Conflict and Cultural Property Protection. Brussels. s. 7-9 (3 s.).

Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, fast and slow. Penguin classic, s, 3-15 og 19-30 (23 s.). 

Kaldor, M. (2013). In defence of new wars. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2 (1) (12 s.)  

NATO (2016). AJP-2(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security. Brussel: NATO Standardisation Agency, s. 2-1 – 2-5 (4 s.).

Prescott, Jody M. (2020). Moving from Gender Analysis to Risk Analysis of Failing to Consider Gender, The RUSI Journal, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1831950, (11 s.).

 

Part 3 – Military Problem Solving
120 pages:

NATO (2019). AJP-5 (A), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations (Edition A Version 2). Brussels, NATO, s. 1-1 – 4-37, A-1 – B-14 (70 s.). 

UK Development; Concept and Doctrine Centre (2011). Decision-Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors (Joint Doctrine Note 3/11).  Shrivenham, Swindon: UK Ministry of Defence, s. 1-1 – 1-5 (4 s.). 

UK Development; Concept and Doctrine Centre (2016). Understanding and Decision-Making. Shrivenham, Swindon: UK Ministry of Defence, s. 3-18 (15 s.). 

Andersen, Morten (2016). Militære doktriner – effektive styringsdokumenter eller teoretiske støvsamlere? Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, Nr 2/2016, s. 15-46 (31 s.).

 
Part 4 – Military Strategic Analysis
128 pages:

NATO (2010). AJP-3.4 (A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. Brussels: NATO Standardisation Agency, kapittel 1, 2 og 3 (41 s.). 

NATO (2021). Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning
Directive (COPD V3.0). Mons: SHAPE, s 1-1 - 1-24, 2-1 - 2-12, 3-10 - 3-60 (87s.).

 

 Part 5 – Planning of Joint Operations
458 pages:

Andersen, M. & Johansen, H. (2016). Kommandostrukturen og det operasjonelle nivå. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 43-56 (13 s.).

Andersen, M & Stræte, P. (2016). Landstyrker. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 171-180 (9 s.).

Beadle, A.W. og Kjeksrud, S. (2014). Military Planning and Assessment guide for the Protection of Civilians. FFI-rapport 2014/00965. (39 s.).

Butler, J.P. (2014). Godzilla Methodology. Means for determining Center of Gravity. Joint Force Quarterly (1st Quarter 2014) issue 72, 2014, s. 26 – 30 (5 s.).

Cooper, Camilla Guldahl (2019). NATO Rules of Engagement – on ROE, Self-Defence and the Use of Force during Armed Conflict, BRILL/Nijhoff, s. 427-444 (18 s.).

Dobson-Keefe, N & Coaker, W. (2015). Thinking More Rationally. Cognitive biases and the Joint Military Appreciation Process. Australia: Department of Defence (10 s.).

Erichsen, O. v. P. & Ødegaard, G. (2016). Luftstyrker. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 197-221 (24 s.).

Forsvaret (2021). Manual i krigens folkerett. Oslo: Forsvarets Høgskole, s. xxx-xxx (15 s.).

Lauder, Matthew (2009). Systemic Operational Design: Freeing Operational Planning from the Shackles of Linearity. Canadian Military Journal Vol 9, No. 4, 2009, s. 41-49 (8 s.).

Libya-utvalget (2018). Evaluering av norsk deltakelse i Libya-operasjonen. Oslo: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon, s. 135-152 (18 s.).

Liwång, H, Ericson, M & Bang, M (2014). An examination of the implementation of risk-based approaches in military operations. Journal of Military Studies 5(2) s. 1-26 (26 s.).

Ljøterud, S. (2016). Planlegging av fellesoperasjoner. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 413-434 (22 s.).

Ljøterud, S. (2016). Spesialstyrker. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 221-227 (6 s.).

Marshall, Jeffrey (2011). Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution. Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) issue 60, 2011, s. 115-119 (5 s.).

Metz, Steven (1991). Analyzing Strategic and Operational Risk. Military Review, 1991, s. 78 – 80 (3 s.).

Meyer, E. (2016). Sjøstyrker. I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 181-195 (14 s.).

NATO (2021) Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD 3.0. Mons: SHAPE, s. 4-38 - 4-86 (48 s.).

NATO (2016). AJP-2 (A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, kap 2, 3 og 4 (37 s.).

Perla, P & McGrady, E. (2011). Why Wargaming Works. Naval War College Review. Spring 2006, Vol. 59. No 2 (21 s.).

Rueschoff, J & Dunne, J. (2011). Centers of Gravity from the “Inside Out”. Joint Forces Quarterly 60 (1st Quarter 2011), s. 120 – 125 (5 s.).

Smith, D, Jeter, K & Westgaard, O. (2015). Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Joint Forces Quarterly 78 (3rd Quarter 2015), s. 129 – 136 (8 s.).

Tanner, J. (1998). Operational Risk Management at the Operational Level of War. USA: Naval War College (17 s.).

Vego, M. (2008). Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, s. v97 – v136 (39 s.).

Wong, Y.H. (2016, 18. mai). How Can Gaming Help Test Your Theory? [Blogginnlegg]. Hentet fra: https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/05/how-can-gaming-help-test-your-theory.html (6 s.).

Zweibelson, B. (2015). Gravity-free Decision-making. Avoiding Clausewitz’s Strategic Pull. Australia: Department of Defence (42 s.). 
 

 Part 6 - Conduct of Joint Operations

137 pages.

NATO (2019). AJP-3(C), Conduct of Operations. Brussel: NATO, s. 2-1 – 5-8, A-1 – A-9, C-1 – C-10, D-1 – D-12 (84 s.).

NATO (2021) Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD 3.0. Mons: SHAPE, s. 4-125 – 4-129 og 5-1 - 5-10 (15 s.).

Nord, K & Andersen, M. (2016). «Gjennomføring av fellesoperasjoner». I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 435-460 (25 s.).

Ravn, B. (2016). «Operations Assessment – vurdering av fremgang og resultater». I: Militære fellesoperasjoner – en innføring, redigert av Morten Andersen og Geir Ødegaard. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, s. 461-473 (13 s.).

 

Del 7 – Course synthesis

0 pages.

Mandatory courseworkCourseworks givenCourseworks requiredPresence requiredComment
Paper22Required
Annet - spesifiser i kommentarfeltet11Required
Praksis11Required
Obligatoriske arbeidskrav:
Mandatory coursework:Paper
Courseworks given:2
Courseworks required:2
Presence required:Required
Comment:
Mandatory coursework:Annet - spesifiser i kommentarfeltet
Courseworks given:1
Courseworks required:1
Presence required:Required
Comment:
Mandatory coursework:Praksis
Courseworks given:1
Courseworks required:1
Presence required:Required
Comment:
Form of assessmentGroupingDurationType of durationGrading scaleProportionOral examinationCommentSupported materials
Individuell fagoppgaveIndividual12Week(s)A-F100%Not required
Vurderinger:
Form of assessment:Individuell fagoppgave
Grouping:Individual
Duration:12
Type of duration:Week(s)
Grading scale:A-F
Proportion:100%
Oral examination:Not required
Comment:
Supported materials:
Authors: 
Morten Flagestad