OPS2203 Complex Operations

Course code: 
OPS2203
Full course name in Norwegian Bokmål: 
Complex Operations
Program of study: 
Bachelor i militære studier
Credits: 
15
Level of study: 
Bachelor
Teaching semester: 
2022 Spring
Assessment semester: 
2022 Spring
Language of instruction: 
English
Maximum number of students: 
75
Person in charge: 
Daniel Ekrem Helgesen
Course content

This module aims at establishing the cadets' understanding of complex conflicts, and how the different character of conflicts influence the tactical level. It will initially clarify the relation between high- and low-intensity warfare. Furthermore, it will focus on the two most common forms of low-intensity warfare: peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Finally, the module will study the changing character of warfare and how this might evolve in the future, including new emerging technology, concepts and domains.

English is the working language of this module. 

The subjects English and PT will be intergrated with the course program and will have classes in each theoretical week. 

Leader development will run parallel with the course. It's focus and theme will be in accordance with the leader development project.

 

Learning outcome

Knowledge

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

  • Establish a broad knowledge of the most common forms of low-intensity conflicts, and how these differ from high-intensity conflicts 
  • Understand strengths and weaknesses in existing theories of low-intensity conflicts and how they differ from high-intensity conflicts 
  •  Account for new trends and developments for land warfare

Skills

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

  • Apply military force in contexts where actions on a tactical level might have strategic consequences.
  • Plan and lead operations at the tactical level within the framework of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency

General competence

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

  • Understand the role of land forces in complex operations
  • Plan and conduct operations with land forces on the tactical level within the context of complex operations
  • Account for major trends and developments which are likely to affect the conduct of land operations on a tactical level in future operations
Working and learning activities

The module consists of four distinct parts. Part one addresses the differences between high- and low intensity warfare. Part two focuses on peacekeeping. Part three is devoted to counterinsurgency. Part four studies the future of land power and the changing character of conflicts.

The theoretical part of the module utilises individual studies, cadet driven study groups, lectures and seminars. The main principle is to give the cadets as much time as possible to read, analyse and understand the different topics. Lectures are meant as an arena where the cadets can discuss the topics raised by the syllabus, or to explore specific topics more indepth. During the seminars, the cadets have the opportunity to test and exchange knowledge with their fellow cadets, and thus expand their own and other’s knowledge. The cadets run the seminars, but instructors will support if needed.
The practical part of the module will utilise a variety of map-exercises, war-games and a field training exercise. The purpose of these is to give the cadets the opportunity to apply their theoretical knowledge on practical and realistic exercises.

Sensor system

Examination is carried out according to the Regulations for Admission, Studies and Examinations (in Norwegian, “Forskrift om opptak, studier og eksamen”) at the Norwegian Defence University College.

Curriculum
  • Adams, Audrey (2017). What every planner should know about Cyberspace operations. USNWCJOURNALS > MOC-WARFIGHTER > Vol. 1 > Iss. 10 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&conte....
  • Amnesty International (2016). If Men Are Caught, They Are Killed, If Women Are Caught, They Are Raped. pp 4-25.
  • Annan, Kofi (1999), "Two concepts of sovereignty", The Economist (18 Sept).
  • Beadle, Alexander William (2014). Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications (Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), pp 7-21, 66-67.
  • Berdal, M. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in ‘peace operations’ in the 1990s. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 55-74.
  • Berdal, Mats (2008), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Lowe, Vaughan et.al, The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 175-204.   
  • Clausewitz, C. V. (1976). On War, red. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Book I, chapter 1, pp 75-89.
  • Crane, Conrad (2010) Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.
  • Cullen, Patrick and Njord Wegge (2019): «Å varsle om hybride trusler», i Stenslie, Stig, Lars Haugom og Brigt Harr Vaage (red): Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
  • Dalsjø, Robert et al (2019) “Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications”. FOI. Report 4651. Stockholm. pp 9-20 and 72-79).  https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE
  • Erskine, Emmanuel A (1989), Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp 20-49.
  •  Estonian forreign intelligence service (2018) International Security and Estonia. Cyberthreats pp-52-57 https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2018-ENGweb.pdf#page=54.
  • Findlay, T (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp 9-49, 87-123.
  • Findlay, T. (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp124-165.
  • Freedman, Lawrence (ed). (1994). War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 309-351          
  • French, David (2012) ’Nasty not Nice, British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ Small Wars and Insurgencies (23:4-5).
  • Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 1-28.
  • Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 49-74.
  • Giustozzi, Antonio (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, pp 98-133.
  • Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 - 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) ch 3 (pp 1931) and 4.3.6 (pp 37-43).
  • Greer, Jim (2017). “The Weaker Foe part 2” in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/7/11/the-weaker-foe-part-2...
  • Greer, Jim (2017). “The Weaker Foe” in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/7/the-weaker-foe
  • Hazelton, Jacqueline (2017). "The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy – Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency warfare", International Security 42, no. 1.
  • Hew Strachan (2010) Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival, 52:5, pp 157-182.
  • Hoffman, Frank (2009) “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges” in Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter.
  • ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, s.xi-xiii, 1-9.
  • Interview with gen Wesley. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/08/11/this-3-star-army-gen...
  • Jones, Adam (2006), "Bosnia and Kosovo", in Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge), pp 212-224.
  • Kaldor, Mary, Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror, lecture at London School of Economics (Feb 2005).
  • Karlsrud, John and Osland, Kari M (2016), “Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?”, International Peacekeeping, 23:5, 784-803.
  • Kelly, Max and Giffen, Allison (2011). Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Washington: Stimson Center), pp 13-35.
  • Kilcullen, David (2010) Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 113, 29-49 and 147-161.
  • Kitson Frank, (1971). Low-intensity operations, London: Faber & Faber Limited, pp 1-9.          
  • Kjeksrud, Stian, Beadle, Alexander og Lindquist, Petter (2016). Protecting Civilians from violence, Oslo: FFI/ NODEFIC, pp 1-26.
  • Mao Tse Tung (1978) Militærskrifter i utvalg. Oslo: Oktober forlag, pp 239-52 og 26166.
  • Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2016). "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014." In Official Norwegian Reports NOU. Oslo. Chapter 8, pp 121-151.
  • Ofer Fridman, “Hybrid Warfare or Gribidnaya Voyna,” The RUSI Journal 162, no.1 (Feb/March 2017): pp.42-49.
  • Oscar (2019): The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace. Washington DC: Georgetown University press, pp 1-21.
  • Palazzo, Albert (2017). “Multi-Domain Battle: The Echo of the Past” in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/10/11/multi-domain-battle-...
  • Porch, Douglas (2011) “The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN” i Small Wars and Insurgencies (22:2).
  • Rid, T & McBurney, P (2012) Cyber-Weapons. The RUSI Journal 157 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354.
  • Rid, T (2012) "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 35, no 1, 5–32, Feb, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939.
  • Robert Johnson, “Hybrid War and its Countermeasures: A critique of the literature,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 29, no.1 (2018): pp.141-163.
  • Scales, Robert (2019). “Tactical Art in Future Wars” in: War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/tactical-art-in-future-wars/
  • Shy, John and Collier, Thomas “Revolutionary war” in Paret, Peter (eds) Makers of Modern Strategy – from Machiavelli to the Nuclear age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 815-862.
  • Smith, Rupert (2007). “Thinking about the utility of force in war amongst the people”, in On New Wars, ed. John Andreas Olsen, pp 28-43.
  • Spreckelsen (2018). Electronic Warfare – The forgotten dicipline. Joint air power competence centre. Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC vol. 27 pp.41-45 https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf#page=4.
  • Stockwell, AJ (1995) British Documents on the End of Empire – Malaya part II. London: HMSO, pp 216-221.
  • Taylor, Kurt and Kay, Larry (2019). “Putting the enemy between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multi-Domain Operations in Practice”. Modern War Institute. West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/putting-enemy-rock-hard-place-multi-domain-operatio...
  • Tharoor, Shashi (1995), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37(4), pp 52-64.
  • Thompson, Robert (1966) America Fights the Wrong War. Spectator, (217:7207).
  • Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 21-49.
  • Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 50-62.
  • TRADOC (2018) “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”. pp. 5-46 https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-31_30Nov2018.pdf
  • UN Doc. UNSC Res. 425, 426 and 427.
  • UN Doc. UNSC Res/1291(2000), pp 1-6.
  • United Nations (1978). Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).
  • United Nations (1996), “UNPROFOR” in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), s. 556-563.
  • United Nations (1996). “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)” in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), pp 83-85, 88-96.
  • United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], pp 9-12, 14-20.
  • United Nations (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. pp13-40, 47-52.
  • US Army & US Marine Corps (2006). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3-24) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp xxi-xliii (Seawalls foreword added separately), pnt 1-52, pnts 7-1 – 7-25,  pnts 7-45 – 7-48. NOTE: required reading is marked in paragraph points, NOT pages.
  • USMC (1940). Small Wars, Washington: United States government printing officer, pp 1 and 11-16.

 

  • Amnesty International (2016). If Men Are Caught, They Are Killed, If Women Are Caught, They Are Raped. pp 4-25.   
  • Annan, Kofi (1999), "Two concepts of sovereignty", The Economist (18 Sept).
  • Beadle, Alexander William (2014). Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications (Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), pp 7-21, 66-67.
  • Berdal, M. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in ‘peace operations’ in the 1990s. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 55-74.
  • Berdal, Mats (2008), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Lowe, Vaughan et.al, The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 175-204.
  • Clausewitz, C. V. (1976). On War, red. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Book I, chapter 1, pp 75-89.
  • Crane, Conrad (2010) Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.
  • Cullen, Patrick and Njord Wegge (2019): «Å varsle om hybride trusler», i Stenslie, Stig, Lars Haugom og Brigt Harr Vaage (red): Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
  • Erskine, Emmanuel A (1989), Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp 20-49.   
  • Findlay, T (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp 9-49, 87-123
  • Findlay, T. (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp124-165.
  • Freedman, Lawrence (ed). (1994). War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 309-351
  • French, David (2012) ’Nasty not Nice, British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ Small Wars and Insurgencies (23:4-5)
  • Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 1-28.                                                                                                                    (27p)
  • Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 49-74.
  • Giustozzi, Antonio (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, pp 98-133.
  • Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 - 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) ch 3 (pp 19-31) and 4.3.6 (pp 37-43).
  • Hazelton, Jacqueline (2017). "The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy – Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency warfare", International Security 42, no. 1
  • Hew Strachan (2010) Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival, 52:5,  pp 157-182   
  • Hoffman, Frank (2009) “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges” in Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter.
  •  
  •  
  • ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, s.xi-xiii, 1-9.
  • Interview with gen Wesley.
  • Johnson, Oscar (2019): The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace. Washington DC: Georgetown University press, pp 1-21.
  • Jones, Adam (2006), "Bosnia and Kosovo", in Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge), pp 212-224.
  • Kaldor, Mary, Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror, lecture at London School of Economics (Feb 2005).
  • Karlsrud, John and Osland, Kari M (2016), “Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?”, International Peacekeeping, 23:5, 784-803.
  • Kelly, Max and Giffen, Allison (2011). Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Washington: Stimson Center), pp 13-35.
  • Kilcullen, David (2010) Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 1-13, 29-49 and 147-161
  • Kitson Frank, (1971). Low-intensity operations, London: Faber & Faber Limited, pp 1-9.
  • Kjeksrud, Stian, Beadle, Alexander og Lindquist, Petter (2016). Protecting Civilians from violence, Oslo: FFI/ NODEFIC, pp 1-26.
  • Mao Tse Tung (1978) Militærskrifter i utvalg. Oslo: Oktober forlag, pp 239-52 og 261-66.
  • Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2016). "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014." In Official Norwegian Reports NOU. Oslo. Chapter 8, pp 121-151
  • Porch, Douglas (2011) “The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN” i Small Wars and Insurgencies (22:2)
  • Shy, John and Collier, Thomas “Revolutionary war” in Paret, Peter (eds) Makers of Modern Strategy – from Machiavelli to the Nuclear age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 815-862.    
  • Smith, Rupert (2007). “Thinking about the utility of force in war amongst the people”, in On New Wars, ed. John Andreas Olsen, pp 28-43.
  • Stockwell, AJ (1995) British Documents on the End of Empire – Malaya part II. London: HMSO, pp 216-221    
  • Tharoor, Shashi (1995), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37(4), pp 52-64.
  • Thompson, Robert (1966) America Fights the Wrong War. Spectator, (217:7207)
  • Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 21-49.
  • Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 50-62.
  • TRADOC (2018) “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”. pp. 1-46
  • UN Doc. UNSC Res/1291(2000), pp 1-6.                                               
  • UN Doc. UNSC Res. 425, 426 and 427.
  • United Nations (1978). Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). 
  • United Nations (1996), “UNPROFOR” in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), s. 556-563.
  • United Nations (1996). “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)” in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), pp 83-85, 88-96.
  • United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], pp 9-12, 14-20.
  • United Nations (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. pp13-40, 47-52.
  • US Army & US Marine Corps (2006). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3-24) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp xxi-xliii (Seawalls foreword added separately), pnt 1-52, pnts 7-1 – 7-25,  pnts 7-45 – 7-48. NOTE: required reading is marked in paragraph points, NOT pages.
  • USMC (1940). Small Wars, Washington: United States government printing officer, pp 1 and 11-16.
Mandatory courseworkCourseworks givenCourseworks requiredPresence requiredComment
Paper11Required
Muntlig fremlegg11Required
Obligatoriske arbeidskrav:
Mandatory coursework:Paper
Courseworks given:1
Courseworks required:1
Presence required:Required
Comment:
Mandatory coursework:Muntlig fremlegg
Courseworks given:1
Courseworks required:1
Presence required:Required
Comment:
Form of assessmentGroupingDurationType of durationGrading scaleProportionOral examinationCommentSupported materials
Individual paper assignmentIndividual12Week(s)A-F 100%Not required The students are required to write an essay of 3,500 words during the module. Questions for the essay will be handed out at the start and the students are expected to hand in their essay at the end of the module. The essay will be graded A-F and will count for 100% of the grade in the module.
Vurderinger:
Form of assessment:Individual paper assignment
Grouping:Individual
Duration:12
Type of duration:Week(s)
Grading scale:A-F
Proportion: 100%
Oral examination:Not required
Comment: The students are required to write an essay of 3,500 words during the module. Questions for the essay will be handed out at the start and the students are expected to hand in their essay at the end of the module. The essay will be graded A-F and will count for 100% of the grade in the module.
Supported materials: